A Critique Of Free-Will Theism, Part Two -- By: Robert A. Pyne
Journal: Bibliotheca Sacra
Volume: BSAC 158:632 (Oct 2001)
Article: A Critique Of Free-Will Theism, Part Two
Author: Robert A. Pyne
BSac 158:632 (Oct 01) p. 387
A Critique Of Free-Will Theism, Part Two
[Robert A. Pyne is Professor of Systematic Theology, Dallas Theological Seminary, Dallas, Texas, and Stephen R. Spencer is Professor of Theology, Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois.]
Free-Will Theism, also known as open theism or relational theism, is a relatively recent teaching that has occasioned significant debate among American evangelicals. Free-will theists differ from classical theists by rejecting divine timelessness, meticulous providence, and exhaustive foreknowledge, and they differ from process theists by affirming God’s transcendence and His ability to act unilaterally in the world.1 The first article in this two-part series responded to the major assumptions and many of the biblical arguments used to support free-will theism.2 This article focuses on several remaining issues, particularly relating to theological method and soteriology.
A Review Of Major Arguments
The first article identified and answered four assumptions that seem foundational to free-will theism. First, free-will theists believe humans must have libertarian freedom, for genuine personal responsibility, they say, is incompatible with any kind of determinism.3 In response it was argued that a spontaneous view of
BSac 158:632 (Oct 01) p. 388
freedom upholds the compatibility of human depravity, practical freedom, human responsibility, and divine providence in a way that is both reasonable and consistent with Scripture. Free-will theists do not seem to have given adequate consideration to this view, which has been carefully articulated by classical theologians for centuries.4
Second, free-will theists believe a genuine relationship with God (as with any person) excludes any idea of control or domination, demanding instead the “give and take” of mutual trust, concession, and freedom. In response it was argued that this understanding of relationships depends on definitions grounded simply in the common experience of persons, which may or may not have relevance to divine-human relationships.
Third, free-will theists believe evil must not be regarded in any way as the sovereign plan of God, who has the capacity to intervene but does not normally impose His will on the world. In response it was argued that free-will theists are correct in affirming God’s ability to intervene in the world, but such an affirmation demands a higher view of providence than they will admit...
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