Journal: Bibliotheca Sacra
Volume: BSAC 46:181 (Jan 1889)
Article: The Divine Immanency
Author: James Douglas

BSac 46:181 (Jan 1889) p. 50

The Divine Immanency

Rev. James Douglas

[Continued from Vol. 45. p. 584.]

The Relation Of The Doctrine Of The Divine Immanency To Instinct

Amid all the diversities of the definitions given to the term “instinct” by naturalists and scientists, there is one point in which they all agree; it is in regarding instinct as an impulse. In its manifestation of intelligence, it is commonly placed in contrast with reason, in that, the being possessing the endowment of reason, acts with conscious forethought; in other words, the action is self-directive; but the possessor of instinct acts mechanically, or automatically, by an impulse which it has no power to direct or control.

Instinct, as a power or principle of intelligence in animals, differs from intellect in man, in that the latter is self-conscious and self-directive, choosing the means adapted to the end, but the former acts as an impulse, without self-direction. The activities properly denominated “instinctive,” manifest an ability to meet without instruction or experience the demands of the appetites and desires, and to do not only those things essential for the continuance of the individual and species, but also, such things as involve the skill requisite for building nests, cells, and defences, for the procreation and protection of the young, and for obtaining food for their sustenance as if possessing the power of forecasting their future wants. Superadded to this, we find, in the case of many animals, the ability to construct defences, whereby they

BSac 46:181 (Jan 1889) p. 51

may guard and protect themselves from the attacks of their enemies, to organize governments, to meet various exigencies, by the skilful adaptation of means to ends, which seem at least to indicate intelligence or reflective consciousness and self-direction.

The intelligence manifested in these acts necessitates the existence of mind somewhere, as the directive and impelling power of the instinct. If the act is an intelligent one, somewhere there must be a power of intelligence directing it. But in the case of the animal, it is not self-directive, and for this reason the intelligence cannot be self-conscious, but must have its existence back of the self-consciousness of the animal, thus directing the movements which are, so far as the animal is concerned, mechanical and automatic.

There is confessedly great difficulty in distinguishing between acts that are instinctive and those which are reflex, and again those which are intelligent. We will, however, consider some of those acts most commonly considered instinctive, with a view to their analysis, that we may find what is the character of that intelligence which constitutes the direct...