Journal: Bibliotheca Sacra
Volume: BSAC 47:187 (Jul 1890)
Article: The Mind Back Of Consciousness
Author: Israel E. Dwinell

BSac 47:187 (July 1890) p. 369

The Mind Back Of Consciousness

Rev. Prof. Israel E. Dwinell

THERE is a class of facts that trouble every school of philosophy seeking to explain the phenomena of mind.

They are the workings of the mind in mysterious methods and regions outside of its ordinary activity, breaking in upon consciousness in. an imperial way. They are of different kinds and functions; as, the assumptions and conditions of thought which the mind has not worked out but finds furnished at hand; the inspirations that come unexpectedly into the realm of thought to enrich and ennoble it; and the intellectual processes that go on in the dark, when we not only give no conscious force to secure them, but seem to devote elsewhere all our available energy, while they spring into finished form from their unknown retreat.

Writers on psychology, in forming their systems, generally give their first and principal attention to the more obvious and commonplace phenomena, such as occur fully within the reach of consciousness or even of the senses; and then, when

BSac 47:187 (July 1890) p. 370

their theory is completed and they feel secure in their position so far, they construct an annex for these obtrusive, neglected wanderers. But, as in the case of other annexes, the spirit, genius, and purpose of the principal establishment go over into the annex. The philosophy that rules in perception and cognition is the philosophy that colors the interpretation of the more subtle phenomena. The consequence is, these most subtle and kingly forces are often treated as if they had no substantial reality, no claims,—as if they were merely a play of color, a phosphorescent sheen, arising from the other powers and workings of the mind, and no other account need be made of them, than to point to them and state their insignificance and marvellousness. Instead of being approached reverently and docilely as material of prime importance,—to issue commands and to mould theories,—they are generally regarded as something to play with, or for conjurors to turn into any shape they please for amusement.

But why may not these phenomena be accepted as central and fundamental in psychological inquiry? Why may not they stand out in all their naked force, requiring other facts to be explained in harmony with them, and not that they should be explained under other facts? If we begin our psychological discussion with sensation, why need we work along that line exclusively, giving us only a sense-philosophy? Why may we not, when we come to facts that naturally report themselves in consciousness and the workings of the mind as of another order and issuing from another realm, recognize them as such and entitled to separate and co-ordinate authority in our systems? ...