Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology, Evidentialism, And Evangelical Apologetics -- By: John D. Laing
Journal: Global Journal of Classical Theology
Volume: GJCT 09:2 (Oct 2011)
Article: Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology, Evidentialism, And Evangelical Apologetics
Author: John D. Laing
Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology, Evidentialism, And Evangelical Apologetics
Asst. Professor of Theology & Philosophy
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary
Houston, Texas
I. Introduction
In this paper, I hope to evaluate the usefulness of reformed epistemology in an evangelical apologetic. Specifically, I will argue that Alvin Plantinga’s appeal to properly basic belief in God is not as helpful as some may generally think. Although it seems to answer the atheistic objection to belief by placing the burden of proof upon the detractor of Christianity, it opens doors to several theological enterprises with which most evangelicals do not feel comfortable. In addition, the answers given by Plantinga to the major objections have, to some extent, tended to undermine the very project of reformed epistemology. Before an evaluation of reformed epistemology may be undertaken, a brief explanation of its tenets and responses to criticisms will be presented.
II. Reformed Epistemology
Reformed Epistemology is the name given to a particular approach to religious belief that has seen a revival of sorts in recent years, largely due to the work of men such as William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, George Mavrodes, among others.1 According to reformed epistemologists, belief in God is properly basic, at least for some people. The assertion that theistic belief is properly basic is the claim that “the believer is entirely within his intellectual rights in believing as he does even if he doesn’t know of any good theistic argument (deductive or inductive), even if he doesn’t believe that there is any such argument, and even if in fact no such argument exists.”2 That is, Plantinga argues that one does not have to reason his way to theistic belief; that “it is perfectly rational to accept belief in God without accepting it on the basis of any other beliefs or propositions at all.”3
The claim that belief in God is properly basic is Plantinga’s attempt to answer what he refers to as the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief. The evidentialist challenge primarily deals with the reasons one holds to belief in God and states that there must be good reasons for one’s belief to be rational. As Plantinga puts it, evidentialist objectors “have argued that belief in God is irrational or unreasonable or not rationally acceptable or intellectually irresponsible or noetically substandard, because, as they say, there is insufficient evidence for it.”4 If belief in God ...
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