Journal: Grace Theological Journal
Volume: GTJ 11:2 (Fall 1990)
Article: Third Class Conditions in First John
Author: David L. Washburn

GTJ 11:2 (Fall 90) p. 221

Third Class Conditions in First John

David L. Washburn

Most of the third class conditions in the First Epistle of John {1 John} are of the “present general” type, i.e., they express conditions based on present states or realities rather than future probabilities. These conditions share a semantic domain with the articular participle, and John often uses both constructions to express the same idea. The choice of one or the other had to do with stylistic variation rather than difference of meaning.

* * *

Some time ago, James Boyer published a study of third class conditions in the New Testament. In it, he disputed the semantic distinction between the “future probable” and “present general” uses of ἐάν with the subjunctive.

If it seems strange to us that such distinct types should be thrown together in one grammatical form it should alert us to the probability that we are not looking at it as the Greek writer did. Apparently he did not see these as diverse types; there must be some common characteristic which in his mind linked them in the same manner of expression. His choice to use the subjunctive points to the common element. They are both undetermined, contingent suppositions, future in time reference. Whether that potentiality was seen as some particular occurrence or one which would produce the result whenever it occurred was not the primary thought in the mind of the speaker. He used a form which in either case expressed a future eventuality.1

Many grammarians, on the other hand, posit a semantic distinction between future probability vs. present general conditions based on the tenses used in the apodosis of the condition.2 Boyer questioned this, as well.

GTJ 11:2 (Fall 90) p. 222

Next, examining the 81 examples of the present indicative in the apodosis of general suppositions, it is probable that even these represent future time. 20 of these seem to be gnomic or atemporal, which includes future time. But specifically in the apodosis of a contingent condition this present must be logically future to the fulfillment of the protasis.3

The trouble is, this logical connection is true of first class conditions, as well. Thus, in the simple statement “If it’s raining, you need to come inside,” the apodosis (coming inside) is logically future to the protasis (rain falling). But this does not necessarily mean that the whole matter is future from the writer’s point of view. Expressed with a Greek subjunctive, this sentence could ...