Paul Tillich’s Solution To The Problem Of Religious Language -- By: Irving Hexham
Journal: Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
Volume: JETS 25:3 (Sep 1982)
Article: Paul Tillich’s Solution To The Problem Of Religious Language
Author: Irving Hexham
JETS 25:3 (September 1982) p. 343
Paul Tillich’s Solution To The Problem
Of Religious Language
The great achievement of Paul Tillich was the coherent meaning that he gave to “religious language.” His genius can only be fully realized when we have understood what he is seeking to do in his profusion of theological works. To grasp this basic understanding we must see that his whole enterprise rests on a particular philosophical approach to the world. This approach is closely related to his theory of discourse, which is very similar to Wittgenstein’s “language game” theory.
In his discussion of “Verification and Truth” in his Systematic Theology1 Tillich points out various weaknesses in the principle of verification. He argues that truth must ultimately rest upon “what is”—that is, reality. This, he says, necessitates an appeal to the life process itself. Experiments that apply the verification principle presuppose the possibility of isolation, but life itself is complex. Therefore we can only verify separable elements within life. Other elements, such as the tasks of physicians, psychotherapists, educators, politicians, etc., involve the totality of life and are only verifiable within the entire life process not by separating out testable parts. “Their verification is their efficacy in the life process of mankind.”2 is means that our tests of truth and falsity must be appropriate to the subject matter involved. In theology the test Tillich advocates is the “method of correlation.”
Before we consider this, we must examine further his concept of appropriateness. “Method and system,” he argues, “determine each other. Therefore, no method can claim to be adequate for every subject.”3 must beware of methodological imperialism,” since what is appropriate for the science of physics may not apply to the realm of history. The objects under consideration by different disciplines will take on different meanings according to the discipline involved in considering the object.4 Hence it would seem that the “cross of Christ” will have a theological significance for a theologian, but a biologist would view it as a piece of wood, to an engineer it could be seen as an interesting construction problem, and so on. This leads Tillich to say, “The dimension of faith is not the dimension of science, history or psychology.”5 Faith can conflict only with faith, and science
*Irving Hexham is assistant professor of religion at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg.
Click here to subscribe