Journal: Southern Baptist Journal of Theology
Volume: SBJT 02:2 (Summer 1998)
Article: “Misgivings” and “Openness”: A Dialogue on Inclusivism Between R. Douglas Geivett and Clark Pinnock
Author: R. Douglas Geivett

SBJT 2:2 (Summer 1998) p. 26

“Misgivings” and “Openness”:
A Dialogue on Inclusivism Between
R. Douglas Geivett and Clark Pinnock

Editor’s Note: This exchange between Doug Geivett and Clark Pinnock is printed here to familiarize SBJT’s readers with Inclusivism’s claims. As SBJT 1/1, 1/2, and 1/4 have made plain, this journal’s editorial board does not agree with Pinnock’s Freewill Theism or his views on Inclusivism. Still, we thought it appropriate to let Dr. Pinnock address our readers in this way. We believe that readers will be able to see the clear differences between traditional evangelicalism and what he proposes.

Some Misgivings About Evangelical Inclusivism

R. Douglas Geivett

R. Douglas Geivett is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology, Biola University. He is co-editor of Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, the author of Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick’s Theodicy, and co-editor of In Defense of Miracles.

Max Warren has observed that “the impact of agnostic science will turn out to be child’s play compared to the challenge to Christian theology of the faiths of other men.”1 One sort of response to this challenge is what I will call “evangelical inclusivism.” Whether or not evangelical inclusivism is growing in popularity I cannot say;2 it certainly attracts a great deal of attention these days. At any rate I find the recent recrudescence of inclusivism among evangelicals somewhat unsettling—and I sense that I am not alone.

As it happens, it is difficult to conduct a fully general assessment of inclusivism. This is partly because the label “inclusivism” means different things to different people. It even means different things to different self-described inclusivists. Whereas inclusivists seem to agree that there are varieties of inclusivism, self-described inclusivists do not agree about what counts as a variety of inclusivism. Thus, from the point of view of one self-described inclusivist another self-described inclusivist may not be an inclusivist at all. (From now on I dispense with the term “self-described inclusivist” and let the unqualified term “inclusivist” do the same semantic work.)

Clark Pinnock and I will be exploring the strengths and weaknesses of his own inclusivist proposal, familiar to many through his various publications. The topic and format of this exchange was proposed by the president of the Evangelical Philosophical Society and agreed to by the two of us. It should not be inferred from this arrangement, however, that I assume Pinnock owns a special burden of p...