Journal: Southeastern Theological Review
Volume: STR 16:1 (Spring 2025)
Article: A Defense Of “Extreme” Intentionalism
Author: Ben Holloway

STR 16:1 (Spring 2025) p. 7

A Defense Of “Extreme” Intentionalism

Ben Holloway

Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary

Abstract: Intentionalism is a theory about the interpretation of artworks, particularly literary works. In this essay, I defend a form of intentionalism according to which the intentions of authors are both necessary and sufficient to fix the meaning of their literary works. In the first part, I offer brief definitions of intentions, interpretation, and work-meaning. Second, I defend E. D. Hirsch’s argument for the necessity condition. Finally, I argue that prominent objections to the sufficiency condition fail.

Key Words: E. D. Hirsch, hermeneutics, intentionalism, interpretation, philosophy of literature

… what matters, the point of language or speech or whatever you want to call it, is communication, getting across to someone else what you have in mind by means of words that they interpret (understand) as you want them to. Speech has endless other purposes, but none underlies this one.1

Intentionalism is a theory about the interpretation of artworks, particularly literary works. The strongest of its proponents subscribe to the view that authors’ intentions are both necessary and sufficient to fix the meaning of their works.2 It follows from such a view that interpreters of a work will arrive at the correct interpretation of a work if and only if they recognize the author’s intentions.3 Hence, intentionalism is a view both about what determines (or fixes) the meaning of a work and about the conditions under which an interpretation is correct.

STR 16:1 (Spring 2025) p. 8

Competing intentionalist views suggest that though an author’s intentions are necessary to fix the meaning of a work, they are not sufficient. Even if the author’s intention is recognized, when an author fails to intend a possible conventionally established meaning, the meaning is either undetermined or is fixed by conventions and perhaps the context of utterance.4

In this essay, I will defend an extreme form of intentionalism according to which the intentions of the author are both necessary and sufficient to determine (or fix) the meaning of a literary work. In the first section, I explain the significance of the issue for theological studies. Second, I will provide some definitions for the key terms: meaning, intentions, and interpretation. Third, I will defend the view that an author’s intentions are necessary to fix the mean...