Journal: Southeastern Theological Review
Volume: STR 16:1 (Spring 2025)
Article: The Greatest Possible Story Theodicy: "O Felix Culpa" And A Tolkien-Stump Response To Diller And Adams
Author: Chris D. Lee

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The Greatest Possible Story Theodicy: O Felix Culpa And A Tolkien-Stump Response To Diller And Adams

Chris D. Lee

Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary

Abstract: Plantinga’s O Felix Culpa (OFC) posits that God aims to create a world that rises to a certain magnificent level of value. According to his value assumption, each possible world that contains Incarnation-and-Atonement is exceedingly better that every possible world that lacks Incarnation-and-Atonement; however, Incarnation-and-Atonement worlds are worlds that must include the fall, sin, and the consequences of sin—evil and suffering. In response, Diller and Adams have raised three significant objections: (O1) Incarnation-and-Atonement are logically independent of one another; (O2) Plantinga mis-identifies the relative value of a proper relationship with God in comparison with a demonstration of God’s love (atonement); and (O3) OFC lacks the agent-centered restriction. In response, I offer a Tolkien-Stump response to Diller and Adams’s critiques to supplement OFC. I will argue that the greatest possible worlds contain the greatest possible stories—stories that are not merely moral but beautiful, including conflict and resolution, dissonance and harmony. These are elements necessary in creating characters and stories that are significant and meaningful. Lastly, I respond to two additional problems: (1) the problem of the unredeemed, and (2) the problem of a conflict-free heaven.

Key Words: aesthetics, Alvin Plantinga, Eleonore Stump, felix culpa theodicy, J. R. R. Tolkien, Kevin Diller, Marilyn McCord Adams, philosophy of story, problem of evil

Alvin Plantinga’s O Felix Culpa (Lat. “O Happy Fault”) posits that God aims to create a world that rises to a certain magnificent level of value.1 According to his value assumption, each possible world that contains Incarnation-and-Atonement is exceedingly better than every possible world

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that lacks Incarnation-and-Atonement.2 However, Incarnation-and-Atonement worlds are worlds that must include the fall, sin, and the consequences of sin—evil and suffering.3 In response, Kevin Diller and Marilyn McCord Adams have raised three significant objections:4

(O1) the Incarnation and the Atonement are logically independent of one another; that is, we can have the Incarnation without the need for the Atonement (and, perhaps, even absent of all suffering).

(O2) P...