Barry Stroud’s Argument Against World-Directed Transcendental Arguments And Its Implications For The Apologetics Of Cornelius Van Til -- By: Michael P. Riley

Journal: Westminster Theological Journal
Volume: WTJ 76:2 (Fall 2014)
Article: Barry Stroud’s Argument Against World-Directed Transcendental Arguments And Its Implications For The Apologetics Of Cornelius Van Til
Author: Michael P. Riley


Barry Stroud’s Argument Against World-Directed Transcendental Arguments And Its Implications For The Apologetics Of Cornelius Van Til

Michael P. Riley

Cornelius Van Til advocates the use of transcendental arguments to defend the truth of Christianity, insisting that such arguments are uniquely compatible with the Reformed doctrine of God. Barry Stroud, by contrast, has argued that transcendental arguments (of any sort) are incapable of proving metaphysical conclusions. If Stroud is correct, Van Til’s attempt to defend the truth of Christian theism is undermined. And so, in this dissertation, I intend to explore the implications of Stroud’s attack on world-directed transcendental arguments for the apologetic of Cornelius Van Til. I try to demonstrate that, even taking into account Stroud’s dilemma, Van Til offers a unique, valid method of defending, not only the entitlement to believe Christianity, but also the truth of Christian theism. However, taking Stroud seriously must result in a more careful articulation of the transcendental argument, one that is more self-consciously offered from within Christianity itself.

After defining transcendental arguments and defending my definition, I survey Van Til’s apologetic, showing its theological foundations, and also attempting to ascertain the goal of his argument, specifically, whether he thinks he is offering a proof of Christianity. I then review Stroud’s initial attack on transcendental arguments, address some objections to Stroud, and introduce the idea of modest transcendental arguments, which seek only to show what we must believe. I argue that, from an apologetic perspective, such modest arguments have some use, but fall short of the most robust Van Tilian goals. I follow this with a careful reading of a further argument from Stroud, that the indispensability of certain concepts represents an obstacle to rational belief in those concepts. In reply to these Stroudian objections, I consider the possibility that Van Til’s answer to Stroud is found in a reliance on idealism, concluding that any kind of idealism that would be useful to a transcendental argument is incompatible with Van Til’s theological convictions.

I conclude with an attempt to rearticulate Van Til’s argument in a way that takes into account Stroud’s argument. Such an argument must avoid commitment to creaturely autonomy, while still having persuasive force.

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