Journal: Westminster Theological Journal
Volume: WTJ 85:2 (Fall 2023)
Article: A Viable Notion Of Self-Deception: Incorporating Implicit Bias Research Into Greg Bahnsen’s Second-Order Intentionality Model
Author: James Craig Kaufman

WTJ 85:2 (Fall 2023) p. 287

A Viable Notion Of Self-Deception: Incorporating Implicit Bias Research Into Greg Bahnsen’s Second-Order Intentionality Model

James Craig Kaufman

James Craig Kaufman is a writer and a PhD candidate at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.

While most scholars acknowledge the existence of self-deception, they debate its paradoxicality: How can a person be convinced of a truth then delude himself into believing its contrary? Implicit in this paradox is the notion that self-deception is akin to others-deception, such that one intentionally misleads himself to authentically embrace a false belief. In this article, I propose a resolution to the paradox of intentional self-deception by analyzing the work of Reformed philosopher Greg Bahnsen. According to Bahnsen, self-deception occurs when a subject believes an uncomfortable truth, then deliberately obscures both his first-order belief and his intention to obscure it. By misconstruing evidence, the self-deceiver comes to subscribe genuinely to a false second-order belief regarding his first-order belief, leaving him culpable for both his ill intent and his false belief. Bahnsen’s model has much to commend in its logical coherence and accordance with Scriptural principles. Especially helpful is his distinction between the deceiver and the deceived located in the separation between first- and second-order beliefs rather than in personality or temporality. Bahnsen’s emphasis on conscious intentionality, however, exacerbates the inherent difficulty of formulating a plausible explanation for self-deception. In response to this difficulty, I propose a revised version of Bahnsen’s model that retains its core elements while assigning greater responsibility to unconscious influences without forfeiting human culpability. Specifically, my changes assume that most denied first-order beliefs and a portion of deceptive motivations reside in unconsciousness and that first-order beliefs may themselves be tainted by unconscious self-deception. Most importantly, I assume a primary role for the unconscious mind in second-order self-deception. In support of these changes, I appeal to sociological and neuroscientific research indicating the majority of human cognitive activity is unconscious and to philosophical and theological scholarship finding greater coherence in the incorporation of implicit cognition.

WTJ 85:2 (Fall 2023) p. 288

Self-deception is virtually ubiquitous. Human beings exhibit a remarkable ability to mislead themselves in nearly all realms of experience. The theme of self-deception pervades literature, arts, and social sciences, in the stories people tell and the way they understand themselves. Notwithstanding its prevalence, scholars debate the precise nature and composition of self-d...